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                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION
     OF AMERICA,
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               Plaintiff,
                                           CASE NO. 1:18-CV-566
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          VS.
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     ANDREW CUOMO, both individually )
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     and in his official capacity,
     et al.,
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               Defendants.
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                   TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
             BEFORE THE HON. CHRISTIAN F. HUMMEL
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                   WEDNESDAY, MARCH 13, 2019
                        ALBANY, NEW YORK
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     FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
          Brewer Attorneys & Counselors
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - NDNY

1 (Court commenced at 11:01 AM.) 2 THE CLERK: The case is National Rifle Association 3 of America versus Cuomo, et al., docket number 18-CV-566. 4 Appearances for the record, please. 5 MS. GASE: Good morning, your Honor. My name is 6 Stephanie Gase, with Brewer Attorneys & Counselors, on 7 behalf of the NRA. 8 THE COURT: Good morning, Ms. Gase. 9 MR. ALICEA: Good morning, your Honor. Jose Joel 10 Alicea, from Cooper & Kirk, on behalf of plaintiff, National 11 Rifle Association. 12 THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Alicea. 1.3 MR. SCOTT: Good morning, your Honor. William 14 Scott, New York State Office of the Attorney General, on 15 behalf of the defendants. 16 THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Scott. 17 MR. SCOTT: Good morning. 18 THE COURT: All right. The Court scheduled oral 19 argument with respect to this matter. This is a Notice of 20 Motion -- actually an Order to Show Cause, which was filed by the plaintiff, seeking expedited discovery with respect 21 2.2 to a number of matters. That Order to Show Cause is docket 23 number 21. 2.4 Docket number 28 is a response which was filed by 25 the defendants in this matter and during the course of that

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response, particularly at part three, Mr. Scott had raised an objection to the deposition of the defendant Maria T. Vullo upon the grounds that she was a high-ranking government official and is, therefore, not subject to being deposed.

Docket number 60 is a reply which was filed on November 26th of 2018 on behalf of the plaintiff, and at part C of that Memorandum of Law and response, the issue of the deposition of Ms. Vullo was addressed.

Ms. Gase, I don't know if I should address this to you or Mr. Alicea --

MS. GASE: I'll be arguing, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Let me ask you just a preliminary question, then I would be happy to hear from you. It would appear to me there are two issues here: One is whether or not at the time of the incidents and occurrences set forth in the complaint, whether or not Ms. Vullo was a high-ranking official; and then number two, depending on what your response is, whether or not there is someone else who can provide the testimony which you seek from Ms. Vullo.

So I guess preliminarily, Ms. Gase, is it your position that at the time of the incidents set forth in the complaint she was or was not a high-ranking official?

MS. GASE: Your Honor, at the time of the

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incidents set forth in the complaint, I don't think we are contesting that she would qualify as a high-ranking official.

THE COURT: I didn't sense you were, Counsel, but I wanted to make sure the record was complete. Go ahead, Ms. Gase, what would you like to tell me.

MS. GASE: We certainly are contesting whether she is a high-ranking official now and whether the same standard applies to her as she is no longer a high-ranking official.

THE COURT: Okay. Why don't you tell me, why don't you address that issue, and then address the issue which is of greater importance to the Court as to whether or not this information can be obtained from someone else.

MS. GASE: Sure, your Honor. To the extent Your Honor is not aware, starting earlier this year, Ms. Vullo is no longer with the Department of Financial Services.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. GASE: Now, the purpose of this kind of limited immunity from deposition testimony is to ensure that these high-ranking officials have the necessary time to dedicate to their official duties and that they have greater responsibilities and more limited time constraints than other individuals who we sought to depose. So the Courts in the Southern District and Eastern District, and though we have not found in the Northern District, have not always

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applied this kind of immunity standard with respect to people who are former government officials. In particular, in the case of <u>Universal Calvary Church versus the City of New York</u>, which is 1999 WL 350852, with a pin cite at page 3, out of the Southern District of New York, in 1999. In that case, the Court ruled the Martin test simply does not apply to former officials. And <u>Sanstrom versus Rosa</u>, 1996 WL 469589, with a pin cite at 5, out of the Southern District of New York, the Court in particular even allowed the deposition against the former Governor Cuomo because the test wouldn't apply because he was a former Governor and not an acting Governor. Similarly, in 2006 in <u>Toussie versus</u> <u>County of Suffolk</u>, 2006 WL 1982687, with a pin cite at 2, out of the Eastern District of New York, the Court similarly ruled that that test just does not apply.

However, here, regardless of whether you don't apply the test or you do apply the test, we are still entitled to the deposition of Ms. Vullo.

THE COURT: Tell me why.

MS. GASE: She has unique firsthand knowledge related to our claims. First going back to the time we even filed the complaint, it was clear she signed two of the consent orders that are at the heart of the litigation, she made statements in press releases that were intended to threaten and get financial institutions and insurers under

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her authority to stop doing business with the NRA. The same statements that she made were statements that the Court relied on in its motion to dismiss — or its decision on the motion to dismiss to maintain the NRA's claims with respect to the First Amendment claim.

Additionally, your Honor, she was the author of the April 2018 letters that were sent to every financial institution and insurer under the authority of the Department of Financial Institutions. Your Honor, that's just what we knew about at the time of the complaint. We since have found out more than that. So to date, in January, the only productions that have been done in this case was exactly 95 documents. Almost 20 percent of those documents are correspondence solely from Ms. Vullo to people outside of the Department of Financial Services, with not a single other person in the Department of Financial Services on that correspondence. And it is all correspondence showing that Ms. Vullo was specifically involved in the conspiracy -- pardon me, not conspiracy, the censorship campaign against the NRA.

And your Honor, while we certainly did not include this in our original motion, as we didn't receive the production until January, I brought one example of that correspondence that not only shows what Ms. Vullo was doing, but that shows that she has verbal conversations about

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the exact topics and issues that are part of the NRA's complaints and allegations. And to the extent that Ms. Vullo is having individual conversations by herself with people trying to get them to stop doing business with the NRA --

THE COURT: You acknowledge these conversations were with people outside of DFS?

MS. GASE: Absolutely, your Honor. Would you like to see the example I brought?

THE COURT: Sure. Mr. Scott, were you provided with a copy?

MR. SCOTT: Just now, yes.

MS. GASE: So this was one of the documents that defendants produced to us in January of this year to -- an email from Ms. Vullo to Dave Jones in the Insurance Department in the State of California, and there she is specifically attaching various documents, the Lockton and Chubb consent orders that are at issue in this investigation. In particular, if you go to the third sentence, you can see that she is talking about that she's having -- or the email shows that she's having discussions with Mr. Jones related to investigation of the Carry Guard program, which is part of our selective enforcement allegations that the only and sole reason that that investigation is being conducted is because of the NRA's

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political views with respect to the Second Amendment.

So, your Honor, to the extent Ms. Vullo is having individual personal communications, there's no one else we can ask about who she's talking to and what she's doing and her reasons behind those communications. To go and try to have communications -- to instead go and depose all of these other individuals, like Mr. Jones, who is part of the Insurance Department in California, or other high-ranking public officials out of state that she is urging to go after the NRA, it's simply something that we'll be arguing in front of those officials as well, why they're high-ranking officials that shouldn't be deposed, but this is in particular in relation to her actions and what she is doing. A high-ranking government official should not be able to hide behind their position to preclude deposition testimony regarding her specific actions and the steps that she took to violate the NRA's constitutional rights. This is not a case where she's being deposed because of her position, your Honor; this is a case she is being deposed because of what she does and she has unique personal knowledge regarding her own actions and the justification for those actions.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Scott, let me ask you the same preliminary question. There doesn't seem to be any dispute that at the time of the incident set forth in the complaint that Ms. Vullo was a high-ranking official.

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Ms. Gase argues that a separate standard or different standard applies now that she's no longer in that position.

What's your response to that argument?

MR. SCOTT: First of all, we do agree that she was obviously a high-ranking official at the time, but we disagree that the standard does not apply for two reasons: First of all, the general purpose behind the standard isn't just to present the interference with that officer's day-to-day operations.

THE COURT: But that's certainly part of the consideration.

MR. SCOTT: Yes, yes, it is.

THE COURT: And you have to concede she is no longer in that position.

MR. SCOTT: That's correct.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCOTT: But the rule does exist to try to protect their former status as an executive official and to protect their thought processes and communications in that regard. And in our case, in our opposition brief, we cite to the case of <u>RIE v. Gardner</u>, which dealt with -- out of the Southern District as well, in 2011, where the plaintiff sought to depose the former Commissioner for the Department of Labor and that request was denied applying the Martin standard. So the standard still applies even though she is

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no longer the Commissioner.

And then you do have to look to the second factor of does she have unique information that can only be obtained from her, and the plaintiffs haven't made the necessary showing in this.

THE COURT: Let me ask you a question. Ms. Gase argues that Ms. Vullo engaged, for example, in conversations with people involved in the Insurance Department in the State of California. How else would they garner information regarding the subject of those conversations?

MR. SCOTT: The extent of those conversations, your Honor, are only to the extent, even in this email, of providing the consent orders. And we can look to the <u>RIE</u> case again on this issue. The Court in that case said that plaintiff's contention that no one can testify as to why Miss Smith signed the determination order, if sincere, is simplistic and naive. And they went on to deny the request and depose that former Commissioner.

THE COURT: So I guess to go back to my question, how would you propose they explore these issues which are central to their claim that there was some conspiracy to or attempt to censor the NRA?

MR. SCOTT: I think there has to be at least some initial effort to get that information from somebody else.

THE COURT: All right. Who would you propose they

attempt to get it from?

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MR. SCOTT: They have their -- we've submitted affidavits from the head of investigations of DFS, we've submitted affidavits from the General Counsel. There are certainly other people from the DFS that they can start with before they get to --

THE COURT: My sense is if they attempted to depose people from the investigative services, you're gonna raise a privilege argument.

MR. SCOTT: Well, and that goes to another point that we have in this case. We have both a 12(c) motion pending as to the equal protection claim, which may limit the amount of discovery and may negate the ability to inquire into this, and we also have a protective order pending where if Ms. Vullo is proceeding in her investigatory capacity, there may be privileges associated with that.

THE COURT: Isn't your argument somewhat circular then. You say they should go to people in their investigative department rather than Ms. Vullo to get this information. When they go to depose the people from your investigative department, you're going to say they can't do that because of the investigative privilege.

MR. SCOTT: Well, they may not be able to obtain the information at all.

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THE COURT: Well, how are they supposed to proceed with their litigation if they're not entitled to conduct discovery?

MR. SCOTT: Well, our position is that the equal protection claim should be dismissed in any event, so it shouldn't proceed to discovery.

THE COURT: But it has not happened at this point. So how would you propose they proceed with discovery if they can't depose Ms. Vullo and they can't depose your investigative people?

MR. SCOTT: Assuming discovery goes forward in this case and they are able -- again, depending on the Court's ruling on the protective order -- if they're able to inquire as to those conflicts, they should start with the investigation folks. If the Court says that that is a claim that is going to proceed forward and they have the ability to inquire into that, the first stop is not Ms. Vullo, the first stop is other people involved in the investigation.

THE COURT: And when they go to the investigation department, you're gonna argue that the investigative privilege applies and they're not entitled to question those people.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ SCOTT: Well, we argued that and the Court ruled on it.

THE COURT: Assuming for purposes of discussion

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the Court agrees with you, aren't we back where we started?

2 MR. SCOTT: Well, then the same privilege would

3 apply to Ms. Vullo to the extent that, again, if she's

discussing the investigation and what's going on with that,

the same privilege would attach to her.

THE COURT: So your position is they're not entitled to conduct discovery with respect to this issue because she's a high-ranking official and there are a variety of privileges available.

MR. SCOTT: As we've outlined in our motion for a protective order.

THE COURT: Then how would you suggest they proceed with their litigation?

MR. SCOTT: My suggestion would be they not proceed as to these claims, again because they're not appropriate and they don't have a right to be free from investigation into their criminal acts and they certainly haven't identified that they've been treated differently than anyone else who committed similar criminal acts.

THE COURT: That sort of avoids the point. How would you suggest they garner information in support of their claim?

MR. SCOTT: Again, I think it would depend on the Court's ruling as to the pending motion. If the Court denies that motion and says there is no investigative

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privilege as to the NRA investigation, then we would start with the people who were investigating it, why they did what they did, whom they communicated with and why they communicated with them. And if that testimony yields we can only get this information from Ms. Vullo, then the issue can be addressed at that point in time. But they have the burden now to demonstrate that they have hit all of those marks already, not that they might be hit at some point in the future.

THE COURT: I guess my concern is, Mr. Scott, so assuming I grant your motion with respect to the issue of the investigatory privilege, and just assuming that for purposes of discussion, aren't we back here again?

MR. SCOTT: Again, not necessarily, because we haven't done -- there hasn't been any other discovery in this case. There haven't been interrogatories served by the plaintiff.

THE COURT: Again, my question is: Who do you suggest they send the interrogatories to to be responded to?

MR. SCOTT: Well, I think if we are dealing with the issue of interrogatories, that may deal with a different question with Ms. Vullo, that is a less invasive and potentially more narrow discovery device that they could use in this case as compared to an open-ended deposition to, as they say, talk about what she said and what she did.

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THE COURT: So your proposal is they would send interrogatories to Ms. Vullo and assuming you don't have any number of objections, they would get those back and then determine if they need to depose Ms. Vullo?

MR. SCOTT: I think the interrogatories may narrow that issue down.

THE COURT: Ms. Gase, what's your response to that?

MS. GASE: Your Honor, we believe we've already made the showing that Ms. Vullo has unique personal knowledge.

THE COURT: Ms. Gase, I understand that's your position, but my question was assuming -- as the Court has not made a determination as yet with respect to that issue, what is your objection, if any, to his suggestion that you proceed by way of interrogatory, then, if necessary, come back to conduct a deposition? And before you respond, all of this discovery can be held in abeyance pending a decision by Judge McAvoy on the motion to dismiss because you don't know if DFS will be a party, so --

MS. GASE: Well, your Honor, just to be clear, no matter what happens on the motion to dismiss, Ms. Vullo will still be a party --

THE COURT: I understand that.

MS. GASE: -- and she is a party because of our

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First Amendment claims regarding retaliation.

THE COURT: I guess what I'm trying to convey to you is if you want to proceed with Ms. Vullo's deposition before you get a decision from Judge McAvoy, you can do that, but you're not getting a second bite of the apple if he rules in your favor on that motion. I want you to understand that we are not bringing the same witness back twice if I determine you can depose her.

MS. GASE: No, we absolutely understand that, your Honor. It was our understanding that any type of stay of discovery with respect to the equal protection claim was already denied.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. GASE: Discovery is supposed to be going forward on the equal protection.

THE COURT: I understand that. But I want you to understand that if you depose Ms. Vullo -- for purposes of discussion, if I determine you can depose her and Judge McAvoy denies their motion, again for purposes of discussion, you're not bringing Ms. Vullo back to conduct a second deposition, that was sort of my point.

MS. GASE: And I absolutely understand that and I guess I want to clarify that we have every intention -- it's not our understanding that we can't depose Ms. Vullo right now on both issues, 'cause there's been no stay as to asking

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her about the equal protection issues.

THE COURT: We are getting somewhat far afield because I haven't determined whether you can depose her, but I'm somewhat perplexed as to the validity of deposing someone on that issue pending a decision on the motion.

Let's go back to my interrogatory question. Why are interrogatories not a way to preliminarily proceed and see if you can get this information from Ms. Vullo without the need for a deposition?

MS. GASE: Because, your Honor, the type of questions and discovery we need with respect to her deposition aren't of the type we anticipate being able to get through an interrogatory response. So, for example, trying to get a full-fledged discussion of the -- of what she said with respect to the Insurance Department of California with regard to the NRA's Carry Guard program, a tit-for-tat or a he-said-she-said is not what we really anticipate ever being able to get from an interrogatory response. Typically, in fact, when you ask someone to describe in detail a conversation in an interrogatory response, the response comes back and says we're not gonna do that, that's the type of thing you would get in deposition testimony. And there is no one else we are going to be able to get to find out what Ms. Vullo said to these individuals when she's the only person in those meetings.

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We can't get that from the head of investigations, we can't get that from the General Counsel of DFS, we can only get that from her and why she said it, what her thought process was behind why she is going to these other governmental agencies and telling them you guys need to go after the NRA, you guys need to do various actions and steps regarding the NRA. And that kind of detail is not what we're gonna get from an interrogatory. Don't get me wrong, we absolutely do intend to propound interrogatories with respect to the defendants in this litigation. Part of the reason why we withheld on that is because we want to get some of the issues resolved that's in the motion to compel currently and get some of the documents prior to that. But there's no reason to hold off on a decision when there is sufficient evidence right now to show that Ms. Vullo has unique personal knowledge. And we're not sitting here today and gonna say that, you know, we need a deposition of her tomorrow. We would like to get some documents after Your Honor responds on the motion to compel, but there's also no reason to continue to push down an issue that has been fully briefed and that can be decided right now based on the few documents that the parties have already produced in this litigation and the public documents that are available showing Ms. Vullo is making public statements and is going and having individual discussions as part of this censorship

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retaliation claim, the First Amendment claim that will survive regardless of any decision on the motion to dismiss.

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Scott, what else do you want to tell me?

MR. SCOTT: Just one thing I should note, your Honor, that in the context of this equal protection claim, the allegation isn't as to what the State of California did to enforce or didn't enforce. The question is what happened at DFS. So even in this context of wanting to get into discussions with other governmental agencies doesn't really further that claim.

Secondly, the cases we point out several times in our papers hinges upon the baseless allegations of back room dealings and financial institutions cutting off business with the NRA. I assume that before the guidance letters were issued, the NRA knows who they did business with, I assume after they were issued who stopped doing business with them, and that they could inquire of them if they had communications with Ms. Vullo to point to that claim. So it points out again there are other ways to try to get this information other than going directly to the superintendent of DFS.

THE COURT: Anything else you want to tell me, Mr. Scott?

MR. SCOTT: No, your Honor.

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MS. GASE: The only other comment I have is focusing on this equal protection claim, they do support her censorship campaign claim that Ms. Vullo is going out there and affirmatively trying to get other companies, the other governmental agencies to censor the NRA, that is the substance and basis of our First Amendment claim that is going to proceed, that has survived a motion to dismiss because of those exact allegations.

THE COURT: All right. We are gonna take a recess, a ten-minute recess so I can speak to my law clerks and see if I have any additional questions for you. I am gonna reserve decision on this matter. Initially, I was going to try to issue a decision from the bench, but I don't think I can do that today. I would like to see my law clerks.

MR. SCOTT: Thank you, your Honor.

(Short recess taken at 11:25 AM.)

(Court reconvened at 11:36 AM.)

THE COURT: All right. Please be seated.

Ms. Gase, let me ask you a question. For example, if we go back and look at this email which you gave to me, which is dated August 7th of 2018, apparently directed to Dave Jones, who is someone in the Insurance Department in the State of California, why can't you garner information regarding what transpired in that transaction from Mr. Jones

as opposed to Ms. Vullo?

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MS. GASE: Well, again, so Ms. Vullo has had these conversations not only with Mr. Jones --

THE COURT: I just used him as an example.

MS. GASE: -- yes, so with dozens of other people.

It's my understanding that she's talking to other heads

of -- Commissioners.

THE COURT: Okay. So your concern is if you go to California and you seek to depose Mr. Jones, he is gonna raise the same --

MS. GASE: Absolutely, your Honor, and he --

THE COURT: -- California privilege?

MS. GASE: And he has a whole heck of a lot less of involvement, direct involvement, than Ms. Vullo does.

THE COURT: All right. I guess, Mr. Scott, my question to you is I remain concerned about how they're to proceed with their litigation if I tell 'em they can't depose Ms. Vullo, when they go to talk to your counsel's office, you're gonna raise the attorney/client privilege, and when they go to talk to your investigators, you're gonna raise the investigation privilege. How are they capable of doing discovery?

MR. SCOTT: Well, again, your Honor, I think one of the problems that maybe the Court's facing and I'm facing in trying to answer this is we're trying to guess what those

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questions are gonna be in a vacuum, which is why I brought up the question of interrogatories, that that may be a way of dealing with this issue. We will know whether or not the questions are something that we're going to be asserting a privilege for or that they're an appropriate, less intrusive means to deal with the case.

THE COURT: I guess, Mr. Scott, my concern is, and I agree with Ms. Gase, certainly these questions are not appropriate for interrogatories. If I want to know what transpired in the conversation between Mr. Jones and Ms. Vullo, that's traditionally something you pursue at a deposition, not through an interrogatory. So, the other thing is they're limited to the number of interrogatories they can ask. My understanding is when they depose a witness under the Federal Rules, they're entitled to seven hours. The number of interrogatories is severely limited. So they're not exactly equal discovery tools.

MR. SCOTT: Well, but, again, the case law sets forth that there does have to be those initial steps. If the interrogatories prove to be insufficient and that there is further information as appropriate to be the subject of a deposition, that would be the issue raised at that time, but you don't get there until they make those efforts.

THE COURT: So they're gonna serve their -- and I believe it's 26 interrogatories --

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MR. SCOTT: Twenty-six or 25, I think.

THE COURT: -- whatever the number is under the Federal Rules, they clearly can't explore or gain all the information they want, so aren't we just sort of delaying this discussion?

MR. SCOTT: I don't think so, your Honor, because I think some of this is going to be questions of, again, what discussions, if any, occurred because if we're talking about discussions that occurred with other financial institutions, other people, there may be answers where there were no discussions. If we're talking about what the communication was with California, again, to a certain extent, I don't even know that that's a relevant inquiry because we don't govern what California does or doesn't do by way of regulation.

THE COURT: I understand that, but depending on what was said by Ms. Vullo in the course of that conversation, it could be supportive of their theory that an effort was made by the Governor and Ms. Vullo to censor the NRA. I don't know whether it is or is not, but absent some knowledge as to that conversation, it's sort of hard to know.

MR. SCOTT: Except I would say that this email that they produced in this context somewhat speaks for itself, so to the extent that their question is, well, what

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does this email say and what does it mean, it just indicates that they're being provided with these consent orders and there really, frankly, isn't that much more to it.

broadly than you do. It says the attached letters on a different topic that I discussed with your GC yesterday, which I assume is General Counsel, the NRA's Carry Guard program, I know you're looking at it, but please let me know if you want any further information from us. The attachment also included two consent orders. I assume Ms. Gase would like to know what the subject of the conversation was between Ms. Vullo and the GC.

MR. SCOTT: I think that would go to Your Honor's first question to her then, why not ask the GC as compared to Ms. Vullo, because, again, that isn't necessarily a high-ranking government official.

THE COURT: It's also someone in California.

MR. SCOTT: Understood. But they have a case where they're making these allegations as to other states being involved in these claims. That's the case they've presented.

THE COURT: The essence of their case is Governor Cuomo and Ms. Vullo allegedly started this process, not the State of California.

MR. SCOTT: Well, they're apparently making an

allegation that somehow they're interfering with -encouraging California to investigate, so they are raising
that specter. But, again, if they want to know what the GC
was told, there is a nonhigh-ranking government official
mentioned in that email that can be inquired of that.

THE COURT: Of course, the GC may be considered a high-ranking official in California --

MR. SCOTT: I don't know, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- and then we're back here again.

Anything else you want to tell me, Mr. Scott?

MR. SCOTT: Not at this time, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Gase, would you like the last

word?

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MS. GASE: My final comment would be the initial steps that the defendants keep referring to, that's not a requirement before you can get a deposition of a high-ranking official who has unique personal knowledge and who was personally involved in the claims at issue. That's not something that you have to go out and do X, Y and Z before this issue gets raised before the Court.

THE COURT: I think the essence of Mr. Scott's argument is that you can get this information from someone else, it's not unique to her but can be garnered from someone else. I understand that's not your position, but pretty clearly their position.

NRA v. Cuomo - 18-V-566 All right. We will get you folks a decision before the end of the month. Thank you for coming in. Have a good day. MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Judge, you, too. (This matter adjourned at 11:43 AM.)

CERTIFICATION OF OFFICIAL REPORTER

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THERESA J. CASAL, RPR, CRR UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - NDNY

I, THERESA J. CASAL, RPR, CRR, CSR, Official
Realtime Court Reporter, in and for the United States
District Court for the Northern District of New York, do
hereby certify that pursuant to Section 753, Title 28,
United States Code, that the foregoing is a true and correct
transcript of the stenographically reported proceedings held
in the above-entitled matter and that the transcript page
format is in conformance with the regulations of the
Judicial Conference of the United States.

Dated this 19th day of March, 2019.

/s/ THERESA J. CASAL

THERESA J. CASAL, RPR, CRR, CSR FEDERAL OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER